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Abstract    
This study examines the relationship between institutional ownership in Malaysia and the quality of reported 
earnings. Given the typically significant stake and unique position of influence, participation from active institutional 
investors is said to provide an effective monitoring role in the companies in which they invested. Using the accrual 
quality model to measure earnings quality, this study provides evidence that concentrated shareholdings, in the hands 
s confirm the active 
monitoring hypothesis, which suggests that institutional investors are likely to actively monitor their investments due 
to the large amount of wealth they invested. Furthermore, 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) to encourage shareholder activism appears to have a positive effect 
on the financial reporting quality in Malaysia. 
 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of JIBES University, 
Jakarta  
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1. Introduction 
ts (Daily et al., 2003). The 
powerful constituency, which plays a significant role in corporate governance.  For example, in the US, 
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the California P
director independence.  In the UK, institutional investors own between 65 to 75 per cent of the United 
Kingdom stock market, which suggests the prominent role that institutional shareholders can play as an 
agent for governance systems (Mallin, 2003). In Australia, institutional ownership grew to about 49 per 
cent of the listed equities by 1997 causing the Parliamentary Joint Committee to remove some legal 
barriers in order for institutional investors to be more involved in the corporate governance of their 
portfolio firms (Koh, 2003).   
The establishment of the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG), which represents the five 
largest institutional funds in Malaysia  the Employees Provident Fund (EPF), Lembaga Tabung 
Angkatan Tentera  Army Savings Board (LTAT), Lembaga Tabung Haji  Pilgrimage Savings Board 
(LTH), Social Security Organization (SOCSO) and Permodalan Nasional Berhad  National Equity 
Board (PNB)  to monitor and deter abuses by company insiders, shows the Malaysian 
commitment to encourage shareholder activism in Malaysia. MSWG functions as the think tank and 
resource centre and as an effective check and balance mechanism on behalf of the minority shareholders. 
In 1997, the Institutional Investor Committee together with MSWG issued the Guide of Best Practices for 
Institutional Investors to provide a framework in helping institutional investors to discharge their 
responsibilities in a responsible way. More recently, the launch of the Corporate Governance Blueprint 
2011 highlights the leading role of institutional investors in promoting governance practices. As 
recommended in Chapter 2 of the blueprint, institutional investors should provide a dedicated umbrella 
body of institutional investors that will enable their collective voice to be heard more effectively in 
addressing governance issues to ensure management priority in the best interests of the company at all 
times.     
In Malaysia, the total institutional shareholdings stood at about 13 per cent of the total market 
capitalization of Bursa Malaysia (for year 2002), representing a higher percentage of institutional 
shareholdings compared to other countries in the same region (Abdul Wahab et al., 2007). In 2010, the 
Employees Provident Fund (EPF), as the major provident and pension fund in Malaysia, released its 
Corporate Governance Principles and Voting Guidelines to show their encouragement for a higher level of 
governance best practices. Although the institutional shareholdings are growing in the Malaysian capital 
market, empirical evidence concerning the effect of institutional shareholding and financial reporting 
quality are very limited. While past studies have examined the impact of shareholder activism on firm 
performance, Hadani et al. (2011) argued that the impact of shareholder activism and monitoring on 
earnings management has not been explored. Our study contributes to the literature by extending prior 
research into the effect of institutional ownership and earnings quality beyond the evidence from 
developed countries, i.e. the US, UK and Australia (Chung et al., 2005; Koh, 2003; 2007; Velury and 
Jenkins, 2006; Zouari and Rebai, 2009; Hadani et al., 2011). The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature to develop research hypotheses. Section 3 outlines and 
explains the sample selection, research method and variable measurement. Section 4 analyses and 
discusses the research results. Finally, the conclusions are considered in Section 5. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
Recent literature acknowledges the importance of the institutional investors in corporate monitoring to 
protect the interests of minority shareholders. Various statements of principles, guides and codes (e.g. 
International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) Statement of Principles on Institutional 
Shareholder Responsibilities 2007, UK Stewardship Code 2010) have been issued internationally in 
providing guidance to institutional investors in exercising their role. In Asian firms, the involvement of 
institutional investors may improve corporate governance practices by mitigating the problems associated 
421 Hafi za Aishah Hashim and S. Susela Devi /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  65 ( 2012 )  419 – 426 
with conflict between the controlling owners and minority shareholders (Claessen and Fan, 2002). 
Although the Asian political culture and business systems vary from Western countries, there is demand 
from investors worldwide for well-governed companies and investors are willing to pay a high premium 
for companies (in both emerging and developed markets) with good corporate governance (McKinsey and 
Company, 2002).  
While the largest institutional owners could possibly curb earnings management due to their position 
in the firm, it is also possible that they use their position to order the managers to manage earnings in 
meeting their own interests (Hadani et al., 2011). Two opposing views associated with institutional 
investors exist, with the proponents of the active monitoring hypothesis believing that institutional 
investors have a greater incentive to actively monitor their investments due to the great amount of wealth 
they have invested in the firms  viewed as long-term investors (Jung and Kwon, 2002; Koh, 2003). As 
sophisticated investors, institutional investors use financial statement information to plan and evaluate 
their investments, making them capable of actively monitoring the quality of financial reporting and also 
for disciplining managers who report poor quality accounting numbers (Velury and Jenkins, 2006). A 
number of studies report evidence supporting the active monitoring hypothesis of the effectiveness of 
institutional owners in monitoring management. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find a significant positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and higher disclosure quality for the US sample.  Chiao and 
Lin (2005) and Cheung et al. (2009) report a positive relationship between institutional ownership and 
performance for listed firms in China and the US.  Similarly, using a Korean sample, Jung and Kwon 
(2002) find that earnings become more informative with increases in the holdings of institutions, 
supporting the role of institutional investors as an active monitor. A recent study by Hadani et al. (2011) 
finds that largest institutional owners constrain self-serving manipulations of accounting numbers. 
Overall, it is suggested that institutional ownership serves as an important complement in disciplining 
management (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) and could increase firm value with low price 
informativeness and good governance (Cheung et al. 2009). 
In contrast, proponents of the private benefit hypothesis argue that larger investments by institutional 
investors provide an opportunity to access private information that may be exploited for self-interested 
behaviour on the part of institutions  viewed as short-term oriented (Koh, 2003).  If this case is true, it is 
expected that concentrated ownership in the hands of institutional investors is likely to reduce the quality 
of reported earnings. Velury and Jenkins (2006) find a positive significant association between 
institutional ownership and earnings quality, but, as institutional ownership becomes concentrated, they 
find that institutional ownership has a negative effect on earnings quality. They suggest that the general 
positive relationship between institutional ownership and earnings quality is affected by increased 
ownership concentration 
Recent capital market development initiatives by the Malaysian Government with the introduction of 
the Capital Market Master Plan have encouraged greater institutional investor participation as corporate 
monitoring. Active participation from MSWG, for instance criticism from Rita Benoy Bushon, the Chief 
Executive Officer of the MSWG, has attracted the media  attention on issues such as takeover and 
privatisation ( , The Star  Star Biz, 19 July 
2012) and disposal ( , The Star  Star Biz, 9 April 2012). 
Given the enhanced corporate governance mechanisms introduced since 2001, it is timely to investigate 
whether or not institutional investors play a monitoring role. Based on the above discussion, the study 
proposes the following testable hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive association between institutional ownership and earnings quality. 
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3. Sample description and variable measurement 
3.1. Sample selection 
The sample was selected from the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia for the period 1998 to 2006. At the 
end of 2006, there were 592 non-finance-related companies list
Consistent with prior literature, all banks, insurance and unit trust companies as well as utility companies 
were excluded from the population of interest as they are subject to different statutory requirements and 
materially different types of operation (Koh, 2003; 2007; Davidson et al., 2005; Peasnell et al., 2005). 
residual value (Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Francis et al., 2005).  For a sample period of three years, nine 
years complete accounting data, t = 1998-2006 is required to estimate accrual quality.  Accrual quality 
data were extracted from the DataStream database supplemented by the Perfect Analysis database.  Any 
missing financial data from the financial databases was obtained manually from the respective annual 
reports.  For that reason, the number of data observations is further reduced to comprise only non-finance 
related companies with complete financial data from 1998 to 2006. After eliminating industries with less 
than eight firms (Davidson et al., 2005) and complete corporate governance data, the final sample 
consists of 277 non- oard from 2003 to 2005.  This 
gives a total of 831 firm-year observations with complete data for dependent and independent variables. 
3.2. Regression model 
The following multiple regression model was utilised to determine the extent of the influence of each 
of the variables in the study on the earnings quality: 
EQ = 0 + 1 INST + 2 NEDCHAIR + 3 MGRLOWNS + 4 FAMCTRL+ 5 CROSS + 6 LNSALES+ 
7 LEV + 8 ROA + 9 DUM_YR04 + 10 DUM_YR05 +                                                                         (1)  
The dependent variable is earnings quality (EQ) measured by standard deviation of accrual quality 
residuals.  The independent variable consists of institutional ownership (INST). Consistent with prior 
studies (Peasnell et al., 2005; Bedard et al., 2004; Jaggi et al., 2009), we include chairman independence 
(NEDCHAIR), managerial ownership (MGRLOWNS), family control on board (FAMCTRL)
cross directorships (CROSS), firm size (LNSALES), leverage (LEV), return on assets (ROA) and year 
dummies  (DUM_YR) as control variables in the regression model.   
3.3. Dependent variable 
We adopt the accrual quality model of Dechow and Dichev (2002) to measure earnings quality. This 
measure has been suggested as an alternative proxy for earnings quality due to estimation errors in 
calculating discretionary accruals (Jaggi et al., 2009). The model of Dechow and Dichev (2002) is based 
on the observation that accruals map into cash flow realizations. Regardless of managerial intent, accrual 
quality is affected by the measurement errors in accruals.  The nature of accruals that are frequently based 
on the assumptions and estimates create estimation errors that need to be corrected in the future. In the 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) study, the estimated residuals from firm specific regressions of working 
capital accruals, on past, present, and future cash flow from operations, capture the total accruals 
estimation error by management and are viewed as an inverse measure of earnings quality. The Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model is measured by estimating the following regression (all variables are scaled by 
average assets): 
                       TCAj,t = 0,j + 1,j CFOj,t-1 + 2,j CFOj,t + 3,j CFOj,t+1 + j,t                                        (2) 
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Where, TCAj,t  is firm j t, = ( CAj,t - CLj,t - Cashj,t +  STDEBTj,t); 
CAj,t is firm j t-1 and year t;  CLj,t is firm j
liabilities between year t-1 and year t; Cashj,t is firm j t-1 and year t; 
STDEBTj,t is firm j hange in debt in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t; Assetsj,t is firm s 
average total assets in year t and t-1; and CFOj,t is firm s net cash flow from operation in year t. For each 
firm-year, equation 2 is estimated cross-sectionally for all firms (minimum of eight firms within each 
industry group) using rolling 7-year windows.  These estimations yield five firm- and year-specific 
residuals, j,t, t = t-  which form the basis for the accrual metric.  Accrual Quality j,t  =  ( j,t), is equal 
to the standard deviation of the firm j
correspond to poorer accrual quality and vice versa.  The standard deviation score is multiplied by -1 so 
that a higher score indicates higher earnings quality (EQ) (DeFond et al., 2007).  
4. Discussions and results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Continuous Variables Mean Median Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
EQ -0.77 -0.58 0.68 -5.28 -0.04 
INST 5.79 3.20 7.58 0 67.83 
MGRLOWNS 0.31 0 0.96 0 9.90 
FAMCTRL 0.19 0 0.21 0 0.75 
CROSS 0.55 0.56 0.28 0 1 
LNSALES 19.47 19.44 1.47 15.16 23.65 
LEV 0.49 0.45 0.51 0 7.79 
ROA 0.03 0.03 0.15 -2.31 2.01 
Dichotomous Variable 1 0 
NEDCHAIR 617 (74.2%) 214 (25.8%) 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the continuous and dichotomous variables used in this 
study. The mean and median values of earnings quality variable are -0.765 and -0.580, respectively.  The 
maximum value and the standard deviations of residuals for the earnings quality variable are -0.040 and -
0.040, respectively. The percentage of institutional shareholdings for the sample ranges from zero to 
67.83 per cent, with average shareholdings of about 5.79 per cent.  In terms of board composition, 74.2 
per cent of companies have an independent leader chairing the board. In respect of managerial ownership, 
the percentage ranges from zero to 9.9 per cent with an average value of 0.31 per cent. In terms of family 
domination, the proportion varies from zero to about 75 per cent, with an average proportion of family 
members of about 18.8 per cent. In terms of board cross-directorships, more than half the board members 
(54.6 per cent) hold additional directorships in other firms. The mean firm size, as represented by total 
sales of the firm, is RM850,752,687. The averages for firm leverage and return on assets is 48.7 per cent 
and 2.9 per cent, respectively. With respect to correlation among variables, the correlation matrix tested in 
the study confirms that no multicollinearity exists between the variable since none of the variables 
correlates above 0.40 (Gujarati, 2003). 
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Table 2. Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient (N=831) 
 
 EQ INST 
NED 
CHAIR 
MGRL 
OWNS 
FAM 
CTRL CROSS 
LN 
SALES LEV ROA 
EQ 1         
INST .106** 1        
NEDCHAIR .023 .002 1       
OUTOWNS .088* .063 -.002 1      
FAMCTRL .198** -.049 -.307** .150** 1     
CROSS .130** .125** .209** .028 -.240** 1    
LNSALES .159** .300** .040 -.020 -.054 .321** 1   
LEV -.023 -.018 .003 -.024 -.088* .051 .134** 1  
ROA -.004 .072* .063 .039 .043 .022 .169** -.133** 1 
4.2. Regression results 
Table 3. Regression Results 
 
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic  Prob. 
C -2.276 0.401 -5.680  0.000** 
INST 0.006 0.003 2.016  0.044** 
NEDCHAIR 0.103 0.056 1.843  0.066* 
MGRLOWNS 0.033 0.016 2.104  0.036** 
FAMCTRL 0.811 0.125 6.498  0.000** 
CROSS 0.311 0.100 3.118  0.002** 
LNSALES 0.057 0.020 2.840  0.005** 
LEV -0.038 0.048 -0.779  0.436 
ROA -0.246 0.273 -0.903  0.367 
DUM_YR04 0.001 0.056 0.018  0.986 
DUM_YR05 -0.032 0.055 -0.578  0.564 
Adjusted R-squared 0.090    
F-statistic 9.163    
Prob(F-statistic) 0    
N 831        
**Significant at 0.05 level; *Significant at 0.10 level. Notes: The reported t-statistics are white-adjusted 
values to control for heteroscedasticity. EQ = the standard deviation of the firm j
INST = the percentage of shares owned by the five largest institutional investors to total number of shares 
issued, NEDCHAIR = 1 if the chairman of the board is a non-executive directors and 0 otherwise, 
MGRLOWNS = the percentage of shares held by outside directors to total number of shares issued, 
FAMCTRL = the ratio of family members on the board to the total number of directors, CROSS = the 
proportion of directors on the board with directorships in other companies to the total number of directors 
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on the board of the company,  LNSIZE = natural log of total sales, LEV = the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets, ROA = ratio of net income before extraordinary items to the total assets. 
Consistent with expectations, this study finds a positive significant (  < 0.05) association between 
institutional ownership (INST) and earnings quality. The result confirms the active monitoring hypothesis, 
which suggests that institutional investors are likely to actively monitor their investments due to the large 
amount of wealth they invested (Velury and Jenkins, 2006; Hadani et al., 2011).  Similar to prior studies 
by Chung et al. (2002; 2005), Koh (2003), Velury and Jenkins (2006), and Hadani et al. (2011), this study 
provides evidence that concentrated shareholdings, in the hands of institutional investors, afford greater 
incentives to closely monitor  T
improves corporate governance practices but also contributes to the higher financial reporting quality in 
Malaysia. As suggested by Chung et al. (2002, 2005), external monitoring by institutional investors is 
effective in mitigating earnings management activity. They argue that institutional investors with 
substantial shareholdings have the resources and incentives to monitor and constrain the self-serving 
behaviour of corporate managers, thus limiting earnings management behaviour. As argued by Hadani et 
al. (2011, p.1354), largest institutional investors have greater incentive to monitor focal firms and 
constrain earnings manipulation by managers in a two-fold manner:  by increasing the risk of 
detection that managers face, and second, by reducing the pressures for short-term performance .  
In addition, the findings of this study could further be supported by long-term oriented institutional 
investors. As discussed by Koh (2003), as institutional shareholdings grow, the exit option becomes more 
expensive. They invest in firms with the intention of holding their ownership stake over a long time 
horizon, and, therefore, have greater incentive to monitor those firms.  
5. Conclusions 
This study examines the effect of institutional shareholdings on the quality of reported earnings. Using 
the accrual quality model to measure earnings quality, this study reports a positive significant association 
between institutional ownership and earnings quality and suggests that concentrated shareholdings in the 
hands of institutional investors, exhibit greater incentive 
finds that an increase in institutional shareholdings has a positive role in determining the quality of 
earnings in Malaysia. It appears that concentrated shareholdings by institutional investors provides an 
incentive for diligent monitoring as they have the resources, expertise and stronger incentive to actively 
monitor the actions of management and improve the quality of financial reporting as supported by the 
active monitoring hypothesis. Perhaps, the findings of this study could support the recommendations by 
the CEO of MSWG for institutional investors 
commitment is for sustainable bottom line numbers through good practices  
, Business Times, 3 August 2011). Nonetheless, Zouari and Rebai (2009) suggest 
 (such as pension funds, banks, investment fund, etc.) 
may have a different impact on the quality of earnings, which provides an interesting avenue for future 
research for Malaysia and other countries.  
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